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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
 
1. United States Navy FY 2004 Budget 
For fiscal year (FY) 2004, the United States Navy’s budget totaled over $123 
billion.  Viewed as a service organization, the Navy provides power projection and 
homeland defense for the nation.  The Navy’s income stream originates from tax 
revenues and the issuance of public debt and is managed by the leadership of the 
Department of Defense and the Department of the Navy.  Purchasing weapon systems, 
operating those systems and paying the people required to run and maintain them are the 
three largest expense categories for the Department. 
There is no question that the Navy is involved in big business.  The magnitude of 
operations conducted by the Department of the Navy is illustrated by comparison to 
Fortune magazine’s 2003 Fortune 500 rankings.  The top ten corporations and their 
revenue values are shown in Table (1). 
 
Rank Corporation 2003 Sales Revenue ($B)
1  Wal-Mart Stores Inc. $258.68
2  Exxon Mobil Corp. $213.20
3  General Motors Corp. $195.65
4  Ford Motor Co. $164.50
5  General Electric Co. $134.19
6  ChevronTexaco Corp. $112.94
7  ConocoPhillips $99.47
8  Citigroup Inc. $94.71
9  International Business Machines Corp. $89.13
10  American International Group $81.30  
Table 1. Fortune Magazine’s “FORTUNE 500” Ranking for 2003 [After Ref. 1] 
 
If the Department of the Navy were a corporation, it would rank sixth in Fortune 
magazine’s ranking.  While a direct comparison is not entirely accurate, it illustrates the 
enormity of the Department’s financial management operations.  The fundamental 
difference between the corporations in Table (1) and the United States Navy is that the 
2 
leadership of a corporation strives to maximize profit.  As a government entity, the Navy 
operates to utilize the income stream provided by Congress to maximize defense utility 
for the nation’s citizens irrespective of profit or loss.  Defense of a nation is much more 
difficult to quantify than a corporation’s quarterly profit figures.  Additionally, the 
organization’s leaders may never know if they allocated resources properly until the 
platforms and people are utilized in a time of war. 
 
2. Fiscal Leadership of the United States Navy 
This challenging task of fiscal leadership is given to the Department’s Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV).  Viewed as a 
corporation, the Department of the Navy has two main subsidiaries, the United States 
Navy (USN) and the United States Marine Corps (USMC).  Despite having two distinct 
subsidiaries, the Department has only one Chief Financial Officer (CFO).  The 
Department’s CFO is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Comptroller) or ASN (FM&C).  Controlling the management of financial operations 
within the Department of the Navy, the Secretary has a unique responsibility as outlined 
in Title 10, United States Code. 
The Office of the Secretary of the Navy shall have sole responsibility … 
for the following functions: (A) Acquisition.  (B) Auditing.  (C) 
Comptroller (including financial management).  (D) Information 
management...No office or other entity may be established or designated 
within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations … to conduct any of 
the functions specified in paragraph (1). [Ref. 2] 
The uniqueness of this responsibility is highlighted above.  Most functional 
responsibilities in the Navy have many stakeholders; however for Financial Management 
(FM), the Secretary’s office is the sole controlling agency.  Per United States Code Title 
10, the Secretary has delegated this authority to ASN (FM&C). 
 
3. Fiscal Responsibilities of ASN (FM&C) 
ASN (FM&C) is charged with allocating a finite amount of resources to the 
platforms and people required to meet the Navy’s contribution to the President’s National 
Security Strategy.  Congress in United States Code Title 10 defines these duties. 
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(a) The Secretary of the Navy shall provide that the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Financial Management shall direct and manage financial 
management activities and operations of the Department of the Navy, 
including ensuring that financial management systems of the Department 
of the Navy comply with subsection (b). The authority of the Assistant 
Secretary for such direction and management shall include the authority to 
– 
(1) supervise and direct the preparation of budget estimates of the 
Department of the Navy and otherwise carry out, with respect to the 
Department of the Navy, the functions specified for the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) in section 135(c) of this title;  
(2) approve and supervise any project to design or enhance a financial 
management system for the Department of the Navy; and  
(3) approve the establishment and supervise the operation of any asset 
management system of the Department of the Navy, including –  
(A) systems for cash management, credit management, and debt 
collection; and  
(B) systems for the accounting for the quantity, location, and cost of 
property and inventory.    
(b)(1) Financial management systems of the Department of the Navy 
(including accounting systems, internal control systems, and financial 
reporting systems) shall be established and maintained in conformance 
with - (A) the accounting and financial reporting principles, standards, and 
requirements established by the Comptroller General under section 3511 
of title 31; and (B) the internal control standards established by the 
Comptroller General under section 3512 of title 31.    
(2) Such systems shall provide for –  
(A) complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information which is 
prepared on a uniform basis and which is responsive to the financial 
information needs of department management;  
(B) the development and reporting of cost information;  
(C) the integration of accounting and budgeting information; and  
(D) the systematic measurement of performance.    
(c) The Assistant Secretary shall maintain a five-year plan describing the 
activities the Department of the Navy proposes to conduct over the next 
five fiscal years to improve financial management.  Such plan shall be 
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revised annually.   (d) The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial 
Management shall transmit to the Secretary of the Navy a report each year 
on the activities of the Assistant Secretary during the preceding year.  
Each such report shall include a description and analysis of the status of 
Department of the Navy financial management. [Ref. 3] 
The development of a five-year strategic financial plan combined with costing, 
budgeting, cash management, and internal control are all core business functions.  As 
defined by law, ASN (FM&C) is tasked with all aspects of the financial business of the 
Navy.  ASN (FM&C) has a mixture of civilian Navy employees and military officers on 
his staff.  Like many defense staffs, civilian employees provide the long-term corporate 
knowledge of the organization.  The military officers who bring their recent operational 
experience to the decision-making processes within the Pentagon help to provide a reality 
check to fiscal decisions. 
The senior military officer in the office of ASN (FM&C) is a Rear Admiral who 
holds the title of Director, Office of Budget.  To execute his budgetary responsibilities 
properly, this officer is dependent on the Navy’s ability to develop and place qualified 
military officers within the Navy’s Financial Management (FM) infrastructure.  In 
addition to proven operational experience, these officers must also have significant 
experience and education in business and financial management processes.   Intertwined 
with budgetary responsibilities, FMB is not only responsible for, but also very dependent 




The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the systems and processes that were 
currently in place to educate, train and prepare unrestricted line officers for critical 
financial management positions within the United States Navy.  These systems’ 
interactions were explored, and upon completion of the analysis, an examination of the 
existing system’s fit to the strategic goals of the Navy was undertaken.  Finally, 
recommendations were made to increase the effectiveness of the process and improve its 
alignment to the strategic goals of the organization. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. Primary Research Question 
• What is the existing management/internal control system utilized to 
produce a senior unrestricted line officer with Financial Management 
training and experience? 
 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What are the system’s strengths and weaknesses? 
• What is the strategic manpower goal of the FM community? 
• How can the system be improved to align with the desired strategic goal? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 
1. Unrestricted Line (URL) Officers 
This thesis examined the Navy’s processes that were used to prepare unrestricted 
line officers for critical positions within its financial management operations.  Its focus 
was macroscopic and global view.  Analysis of the job structure and population of the 
Financial Management community was restricted to the approximately 50 jobs 
specifically designated to require officers with both operational experience (URL 
community) and business savvy.  
Within the URL community, analysis was further narrowed to those officers from 
the Surface Warfare, Submarine and Aviation communities.  This focus was chosen 
because these three communities comprise 95% of the URL community.  Moreover, only 
officers from these three communities have risen to the highest level of enterprise 
management within the Navy, the position of Chief of Naval Operations. 
This focus was necessary to concentrate on the creation of a cadre of senior Naval 
Officers who are not only operationally successful, but also have attained the education 
and experience necessary to properly allocate resources in a fiscally constrained 
environment.  The process to create these officers is complex and  
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challenging.  Once this level of proficiency is attained, Naval officers with these skill sets 
are highly coveted within the organization, and also aggressively recruited by other 
government organizations and the private sector. 
 
2. Existing Processes 
Recommendations for improvement are limited to existing processes within the 
Navy manpower system.  Recommending improvements that ignore fiscal and 
organizational restraints has little utility for Navy leadership.  Working within the 
established structure to recommend managerial improvements is more difficult, but has 
the greatest opportunity for actual implementation. 
 
3. Perspective 
Finally, analysis and recommendations for improvement are tailored toward the 
audience of the Navy’s Budget Officer, commonly referred to as FMB (Financial 
Management and Budget), and his staff.  With any complex system there are many 
stakeholders.  To clarify the process, this analysis will be oriented toward the perspective 
of a single stakeholder.  This will provide potential improvements that support the 




The three major control systems that were analyzed in this thesis include the 
following:   
 
1. Financial Management Billet Structure 
To provide a historical perspective, the 2004 FM billet structure was compared to 
the structure that existed in 1992.  The historical comparison date was chosen due to data 
availability from a previous study.  During the 1990’s, the size of the United States 
military was reduced significantly.   By providing an early data point, this comparison  
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documents long-range changes in the FM community job structure.  Additionally, a 2001 
revision to the Navy’s subspecialty tracking system and its applicability to the FM 
community will be investigated. 
 
2. Financial Management Education and Assignment Process 
A managerial control system methodology was utilized to evaluate the 
effectiveness of existing controls to meet the strategic objective.  Because the 
implementation of control is highly dependent on the people who are involved in the 
process, interviews were conducted to confirm existing controls and to investigate their 
actual level of implementation.   
 
3. Military Promotion Process 
The promotion of military officers is highly regulated by limitations set in United 
States Code Title 10.  These constraints and the process used to select officers for the 
next higher rank will be analyzed to evaluate interaction with the Financial Management 
community. 
 
F.   MANPOWER DATA SOURCE 
 
The Naval Personnel Command extracted the raw manpower data used for 
analysis in this thesis on April 1, 2004.  Unless otherwise indicated, all statistics, tables 
and charts that depict officer end-strength levels, FM qualification or FM billet 
characteristics are from this source and as of this date.  Data were extracted from the 




Following this introduction, Chapter II reviews previous research that applies to 
the Navy Financial Management community.  Chapter III describes the structure and 
processes that affect the development of Unrestricted Line Financial Managers.  Chapter 
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IV defines the role of business and financial management education in the Navy’s overall 
strategy.  Analysis of the applicable control systems and their fit to the strategic goal are 
presented in Chapter V.  Chapter VI concludes with specific recommendations to both 
alter the control of and increase the incentives for the Navy’s Unrestricted Line Financial 
Management community.  Ultimately, these changes will improve the alignment of the 






II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The scope and structure of the FM community has been the object of intense 
scrutiny over the last decade.  From an internal point of view, multiple theses have been 
written at the Naval Postgraduate School that evaluated individual components of the 
system.  Externally, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has conducted at least two 
analyses of the Navy’s Financial Management community.  Other organizations such as 
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the RAND Corporation have conducted 
broader looks at officer promotion, education and retention.  This chapter summarizes the 
studies completed that pertain to the Navy FM job structure, concentrating on URL 
officers.  Other literature that analyzes promotion, education and retention is referred to 
throughout the thesis. 
 
A. UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES 
 
1. Blaisdell Thesis 
In 1996, LT Steven H. Blaisdell conducted an analysis to determine whether or 
not NPS Financial Management graduates were eventually placed into FM jobs. The 
study group was 195 FM students who graduated from 1981 to 1985.  Blaisdell examined 
the number of officers who were ultimately assigned to an FM position sometime within 
the eleven to fifteen year period covered by the study.  Referred to as the “utilization 
rate” by the Navy, the process of filling a subspecialty tour or “payback tour” implies that 
the student owes the Navy an obligation for his education.  The “payback tour” is 
necessary for the Navy to comply with DoD education directives. [Ref. 4]  Written during 
the military drawdown of the 1990’s, the thesis takes on a tone that scarce resources 
should be more tightly controlled and those officers who received an education should be 
expected to provide a return on the Navy’s investment. 
Blaisdell’s research questions covered one aspect of the control system analysis of 
this thesis, specifically, whether officers who receive an FM education were ever 
assigned to a position that requires the education.  Analyzing the Navy’s semi-annual 
report on subspecialty utilization, he identified one of the control elements of the system.    
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After analyzing the data, Blaisdell determined that significantly different 
utilization rates occurred between Staff and URL officers.  Their utilization rates were 92 
percent and 66 percent respectively.  To explain this differential, Blaisdell noted the 
difference between the career paths of Staff and URL officers and stated “a subspecialty 
designation for a staff Corps officer is analogous to a warfare specialty for an URL 
officer.”  [Ref. 4]  This assertion is a critical component of the difficulty that the Navy 
experiences when trying to build URL officers into Financial Managers.  Primarily 
aviators, ship’s company officers and submariners, the career path of a line officer 
includes at least four sea tours.  Between these sea duty tours, there exists limited 
opportunities for line officers to gain FM education and experience.  A detailed analysis 
of these limitations is presented in Chapters III and IV.  The thesis concluded that 
although the rate did not meet the CNO’s existing goal of 100 percent, utilization was 
relatively effective for the sample population.  
 
2. Borkowski Thesis 
Conducting a 1994 cost-benefit analysis of the NPS FM curriculum, LT Paul E. 
Borkowski also identified the qualitative aspects of a defense-oriented financial 
management program.  His conclusion, after comparing costs between NPS and other 
similar Masters programs, was that “NPS was, in every case, the low cost alternative.” 
[Ref. 5]  This conclusion is significant when analyzing the control system.  If other 
universities offered a lower cost alternative, Navy leadership could decide to close NPS 
and shift FM education to civilian MBA programs.  If such a decision were implemented, 
the FM community would lose the qualitative aspects identified by Borkowski. 
Qualitatively, the combination of a military atmosphere, defense related research 
and a thesis requirement contributed significantly to the benefit side of his analysis.  The 
author correctly identifies some of the critical qualitative components of the NPS 
program that would be lost if the program was shifted elsewhere, however the most 
significant benefit that was omitted by the Borkowski thesis was student exposure to the 
federal budgeting process, public policy determination and their applicability to the 
defense environment.  An MBA that is focused on non-governmental business processes 
would be valuable, but less so than the current mix of the NPS FM curriculum. 
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B. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT EDUCATION 
 
1. GAO Report 97-58 
In response to a 1997 query by Senator Tom Harkin, the GAO conducted an 
analysis of the education and professional experience levels of 100 officers filling Navy 
comptroller billets.  Categorizing the officers by line and staff corps, the following 
statistics were calculated for the 53 URL officers. 
They filled mostly senior-level comptroller positions—14 were captains 
and 25 were commanders.  They averaged 17.8 years of commissioned 
service in the Navy, but only 3.4 years in financial management jobs, 
including their tenure in their current comptroller position.  Only 19 of the 
53 (36 percent) majored in accounting or other business-related 
curriculum as undergraduate students.  Thirty-two of the 53 officers (60 
percent) obtained masters degrees in a business-related major, but 14 of 
the remaining 21 officers (26 percent) lacked either undergraduate or 
graduate education in any business-related field. [Ref. 6] 
Referring to $225B of errors in FY94 financial reports, the report connected these 
substantial misstatements to the lack of education and experience of the Navy’s FM 
officers and concluded that: 
The Navy’s personnel practices do not provide a career path for Navy 
officers to develop and maintain the core competencies needed by a 
comptroller. By contrast, the Air Force and the Army offer a career path in 
comptrollership. Because of the Navy’s approach, many officers in key 
comptroller positions lack the financial management experience and the 
accounting education needed to meet the demands of today’s financial 
management environment. [Ref. 6] 
 
2. GAO Report 98-86 
 In 1998, the GAO conducted an internal audit of the Navy’s Financial Managers.  
The report was one of four planned profiles of FM personnel in the DoD, the United 
States Air Force (USAF), the United States Army (USA) and United States Navy (USN).  
Delivered to ASN (FM&C), the report summarized the data collected from Financial 
Managers who responded to a GAO draft survey.   Of the 306 key FM positions 
identified by Navy leadership, 198 of those contacted returned a survey.  The survey 
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collected information on education, FM experience, professional certifications such as 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and ongoing professional training.  [Ref. 7] 
Grouped by activity type, the report summarized respondents from ASN (FM&C), 
Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders, the Chief of Naval Education and Training 
(CNET), Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) organizations,1 Navy Systems 
commands2 and the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Averaging 21 years of 
professional work experience, 44 military officers responded to the survey. Of the 
military officers surveyed, 57 percent reported a business undergraduate degree and 85 
percent reported a business Masters degree.  Officers holding professional certifications 
included one CPA, three Certified Government Financial Managers (CGFM), and three 
Certified Managerial Accountants (CMA). [Ref. 7] 
Although GAO made no qualitative conclusions in the report, the Navy responded 
that the report weighed accounting training and experience too heavily.  Additionally, the 
Navy noted its policy of using continuing education as a more useful measurement of 
education than professional certifications. [Ref. 7] 
 
3. Palmer Thesis 
LT Richard T. Palmer’s thesis analyzed the skill sets required to perform 
effectively in financial management positions.  Conducted in 1992, his analysis recorded 
the structure and composition of the FM billet listing in exacting detail.  This study was 
used as a historical comparison point for analyzing the current FM billet structure in this 
thesis. 
His thesis concluded that the Naval Postgraduate School’s FM curriculum 
“provides adequate coverage of the requirements” necessary to operate effectively as a 
financial manager. [Ref. 8]  The establishment of Educational Skill Requirements (ESR) 
that are reviewed by the curriculum sponsor is a critical feedback communication path in 
the control system.  For the Financial Management curriculum, the sponsor is FMB who 
conducts his review on a periodic basis. 
                                                 
1 Examples of NWCF organizations are shipyards, aviation repair depots and supply centers. 
2 Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Air Systems Command. 
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4. Jackson Thesis 
LT Roger P. Jackson’s research compared the FM program at NPS with other 
similar graduate programs in the United States.  In 1992, the FM program was awarding a 
Masters of Science in Management (MSM) degree instead of the Masters of Business 
Administration (MBA) that is currently conferred upon graduates.  Comparing the NPS 
MSM with leading MBA and Masters of Public Administration (MPA) programs, he 
concluded that the NPS MSM was the most comprehensive of the alternatives.  More 
importantly, he determined that the NPS MSM was an optimal hybrid of the MBA and 
the MPA.  Providing the basic business skill sets of the MBA, the NPS MSM also 
provided the student with academic exposure to federal budgeting and public policy. 
[Ref. 9]  
Since the time of this study, the NPS MSM program has been transformed into an 
MBA, mostly due to popular demand.  The changes add even more value to the graduate.  
Still meeting the subspecialty ESR’s, the MBA adds the analysis of business processes 
that were not previously covered in the MSM.  This shift toward a strategic management 
emphasis while keeping the analytical rigor of the MSM will ensure that graduates are 
even better prepared to enter the FM community. 
 
5. Robinson and Phillips Thesis 
Finally, LT Robinson and LT Phillips did a similar study in 1975 that also 
evaluated the NPS program’s “ability to produce effective financial managers.” [Ref. 10]  
Their thesis identified that weapon system cost analysis and budgeting were the most 
significant financial challenges for the navy at that time.  Predating legislation that 
created the Acquisition Professional community, their identification of curriculum 
shortcomings have been resolved within the NPS curriculum yet cost analysis continues 






C. LITERATURE THEMES 
 
NPS theses were reviewed for the period spanning from 1956 to 2004 and two 
consistent themes emerged. 
 
• No matter the time period referred to, the authors make note of the 
difficulty in effectively allocating funds in a fiscally constrained 
environment. 
• URL officers who bring the reality of current fleet operations to the budget 
decision process are critical to the future success of the United States 
Navy. 
 
In the next chapter, the structure of the managerial control system is defined.  
Additionally, processes that interact with the FM community structure are identified.  
Within those processes, accessible levers of control are acknowledged in preparation for 
system analysis.   
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III. CONTROL SYSTEM STRUCTURE 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter defines the processes and structures that affect the qualifications of 
the URL officer in the FM subspecialty.  Prior to the analysis of any managerial control 
system, the processes involved and the inputs and outputs of the system must be 
quantified and documented.  During the definition process, levers of control are 
identified.  A lever is a means of accomplishing a desired task or state.  In this system, 
the desired state is effective managerial control of the process.  Control is defined as “the 
authority or ability to manage or direct.” [Ref. 11]   Levers of control enable the manager 
to affect the output of a control system.   
In addition to control lever identification, superfluous process steps are removed.  
The end result is a simplified description of the process that is targeted toward the 
intended managerial use.  In its most simplistic form, the qualification of an FM URL 
officer can be viewed as a cybernetic feedback model as shown in Figure (1).  Defined as 
the “theoretical study of communication and control processes,” the field of cybernetics 
has many applications. [Ref. 12]   Norbert Weiner, Arturo Rosenbluth and Julian Bigelow 
created the cybernetic concept in 1947.  This trio of researchers... 
adapted a Greek word meaning “steersman” to invoke the rich interaction 
of goals, predictions, actions, feedback and response in systems of all 
kinds....Early applications in the control of physical systems (aiming 
artillery...and maneuvering simple robots) clarified the fundamental roles 
of these concepts in engineering; but relevance to social systems and the 
softer sciences was also clear from the start.  [Ref. 13] 
As shown in Figure (1), the standard of the system is applied to regulate output.  
Physically viewed as a valve or thermostat, the manager can adjust the process to meet 
his desired output.  Feedback to the process itself or even the system inputs allows the 
system to improve itself over time.  Properly applied levers of control enable the system 













Figure 1.   Overall FM Qualification Process [After Ref. 14] 
 
Applying the model to the Navy’s FM community, inputs to the system are non-
FM qualified URL officers.  After progressing though the process, these officers become 
FM qualified.  With this type of system, the manager can choose to control any 
combination of the inputs, process, standards, or outputs. [Ref. 14]  To define the process, 
the inputs were the first component studied. 
 
B. INPUT - NAVY OFFICER POPULATION 
 
1. Current Status 
As of April 2004, there were approximately 55,000 officers in the United States 
Navy.  Breaking this population down by specialty, Figure (2) segregates the overall 
population and highlights the group of interest, Unrestricted Line (URL) officers.  As 
defined by Navy Regulations, a URL officer is an “officer of the line of the Regular Navy 
and Naval Reserve who is not restricted in the performance of duty.” [Ref. 15]  The 
primary difference between URL officers and all other Naval Officers is eligibility for 
























Figure 2.   Navy Officer Composition  
 
Comprising less than 50 percent of the officer corps, URL officers are further 
segregated into their warfare specialties.  Percentages shown above are based on the total 
55,000 population.  Basically, there are approximately 26,000 URL officers from which 
to input into the FM qualification process. 
 
2. Manpower System Coding 
To process these officers through the Navy’s human resources information 
systems, a hierarchy of codes categorizes Naval Officers. [Ref. 16]   Table (2) shows the 
four levels of categorization that are defined for each officer.  Examples are codes 
assigned to the author of this thesis. 
 
Code Hierarchy Example Meaning
Rank CDR (O-5) Commander
Designator 1320 Naval Flight Officer
Additional Qualification Designator (AQD) DJ4 ASW Patrol P-3C
Subspecialty 3110T NPS FM Student  
Table 2. Hierarchy of Officer Manpower Codes 
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Starting at Ensign (O-1), rank is set by the results of promotion boards.  URL 
designators define the broad professional community that the officer is trained to operate 
in.  These warfare specialty areas are shown in Figure (2).  Officer Additional 
Qualification Designators (AQD’s) are used to assign more detail to the warfare 
qualifications of the URL officer.  For example in the aviation community, two 
Commanders, one an F/A-18 Hornet pilot and the other an F-14 Tomcat pilot, would 
have the same rank and designator, but different AQD’s.  In addition to warfare 
specialties, the AQD is also used to track Joint Service Officer (JSO) and Acquisition 
Professional (AP) qualifications.   
Finally, the subspecialty code is used to document education and experience in 
addition to the URL officer’s primary warfare expertise.  If the Tomcat pilot referred to 
above had just graduated from the FM program at NPS, a subspecialty code of 3110P 
would be added to his record.  Specific subspecialty codes that apply to business 
operations of the Navy are shown in Table (3). 
 
Subspecialty Code Description
3000 Resource Management and Analysis
3100 General Resource & Acquisition Management
3110 Financial Management
3111 Financial Management - Comptroller
3112 Financial Management - Major Comptroller
3120 Logistics and Transportation Management 
3121 Logistics and Transportation Management - Logistics
3122 Logistics and Transportation Management- Transportation
3130 Manpower Systems Analysis Management
3140 Shore Installation Management
3150 Education and Training Management
3210 Operations Research Analysis
3211 Operations Research Analysis - Analysis and Assessment
3212 Operations Research Analysis - Logistics  
Table 3. Business Oriented Subspecialty Codes [After Ref. 17] 
 
 
With the skill sets shown above covering operations, logistics, finance, human resources, 
and training, a group of officers with these subspecialties could effectively manage any 
Navy enterprise.  
This hierarchy and coding system is used by the Navy’s manpower distribution 
organization, the Navy Personnel Command (NPC).  A plethora of data in addition to this 
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hierarchy of skill coding is kept in the Officer Personnel Information System (OPINS) 
database.  The Officer Assignment Information System (OAIS) accesses the OPINS data 
and is used by NPC to match officers and jobs.  Just as officers are coded with these four 
levels, so are the jobs, or billets as they are referred to by NPC. 
 
C. OUTPUT-FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT JOB STRUCTURE 
 
 As Figure (1) indicates, the output of the system is the assignment of a fully 
qualified officer into the FM billet structure.  One of the three main components of the 
FM qualification process is experience gained by working in an FM position.  In order to 
gain this experience, the officer must be assigned by NPC to one of the 409 officer FM 
positions shown in Table (4).  Designator and rank first categorize each position.   
 
Type of Officer Required (Designator) CAPT CDR LCDR LT LTJG Totals
Any Officer (1000) 12 13 8 1 34
Unrestricted Line (URL)
Any URL Officer (1050) 6 13 4 1 24
Fleet Support (1100) 3 3 6
Surface Warfare (1110) 2 4 5 1 12
Submarine (1120) 1 1 2 4
Special Warfare-Seal (1130) 1 1
Aviator (1300) 2 4 3 9
Restricted Line and Staff Corp
Human Resources (1200) 4 9 2 15
Engineering Duty (1440) 1 1
Aerospace Engineering Duty (1510) 1 1
Cryptology (1610) 4 2 6
Intelligence (1630) 2 1 3
Reserve Recruiting Full Time Support (1687) 1 1
Medical Service Corps (2300) 11 22 35 48 8 124
Supply Corps (3100) 11 48 55 28 4 146
Civil Engineering Corps (5100) 2 11 8 1 22
Totals 47 130 135 85 12 409
Rank
 
Table 4. Navy Financial Management Officer Billet Structure  
 
 
1. FM Billet Structure 
As discussed previously, the designator defines the type of warfare experience 
required for the position.  For example, the Commander Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Fleet 
(COMNAVAIRLANT) budget officer is coded as an aviator (1300) billet, while the 
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Assistant Director for Business Operations at Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ships 
requires a Surface Warfare (1110) officer. 
As shown in the first two data rows of Table (4), 58 billets do not require a 
specific warfare specialty.  The thirty-four 1000-coded billets can be filled with any 
officer having the correct rank and subspecialty.  Coded 1050, the other 24 must be filled 
with an officer who has a URL designator.  Operational fleet experience is deemed 
necessary for these positions.   
Other FM billets are distributed over the many Restricted Line (RL) and Staff 
communities as shown above.  Figure (3) shows the proportional breakdown of billets 
within the FM community.  As depicted in the chart above and the graph below, the Staff 








Staff or RL Only
 
 
Figure 3.   FM Billets by Type (Designator) of Officer Required 
 
 
2. FM Billet Prerequisites 
In addition to the matrix shown above, each individual billet has one of five 
prerequisite education and experience levels assigned to it as shown in Table (5).  
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Billet Code 3110Q 3110P 3111P 3110R 3110S
Education Masters Masters Masters No No
Experience Tours 1 0 0 2+ 1
Rank Totals
CAPT 28 15 1 3 47
CDR 9 84 1 6 30 130
LCDR 4 80 6 45 135
LT 1 20 64 85
LTJG 1 11 12
Totals 42 200 2 12 153 409
Job Prerequisites
 
Table 5. FM Billet Prerequisites 
 
A billet designation has two components, education and experience.  As shown in 
Table (5), FM positions require education, experience, or the combination of the two.  An 
officer who has earned an FM Master’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) meets the education qualification.  Degrees from other universities are approved 
by NPS on case-by-case basis.  The experience qualification is achieved after working in 










Figure 4.   FM Billet Prerequisites 
 
 
D. PROCESS -NAVY OFFICER ASSIGNMENT  
 
The process used to match a qualified candidate to each FM billet is shown in 
Figure (5).  Officer Projected Rotation Dates (PRD’s) set the input to the process.  When 
an officer is within one year prior to rotation, he contacts his detailer.  The detailer at 
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NPC initiates the assignment process.  Using the hierarchy of qualifications as the 














Figure 5.   Assignment Sub-Process Diagram [After Ref. 14] 
 
1. Detailer-Placement Officer Interaction 
The assignment process is the result of negotiation between a detailer and a 
placement officer at NPC in Millington, TN.  The detailer represents the career needs and 
personal desires of the individual officer while the placement officer represents the needs 
of Navy commands.  The detailer wants to get the best possible job for his officer while 
the placement officer, similar to a “headhunter,” is tasked with finding the best-qualified 
officer to fill open positions in his assigned commands.  This balance of priorities is often 
expressed as the detailing triangle as shown in Figure (6).   
Detailing
Triangle
Needs of the 
Navy
Career 
Needs of the 
Officer
Desires of the 
Individual  
Figure 6.   Navy Assignment (Detailing) Triangle 
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The placement officer, acting as the command’s advocate, represents the “Needs of the 
Navy” side of the triangle.  The “Career Needs of the Officer” and “Desires of the 
Individual” components are balanced by the detailer to match the officer to available 
jobs.  In many cases, this negotiation results in a compromise from one or both parties in 
the exchange.  This balance of priorities is complex and subject to supply and demand.  If 
a specific command needs an officer with certain qualifications, many times the desires 
of the officer are sacrificed to meet the needs of the Navy.  
As shown previously in Table (4), fourteen different types of officers can fill FM 
billets.  Each designator or community has a group of detailers to represent its constituent 
base.  Each designator community has at least three different detailers representing rank 
based groupings of Captains (O-6), Commanders (O-5) and Lieutenant Commanders (O-
4) and below.   To place an officer in an FM billet requires action from one of 42 
different detailers. 
This interaction between detailer and placement officer is shown in Figure (7).  
On the placement side of the process, there are 27 different placement officers 
representing the 219 Navy commands that have FM billets.   
Detailer
•Responsible for the 
Officer’s Professional 
Development and 
represents his or her 
personal preferences.
•Seeks to find the best 




•Responsible to the 
Navy Command.
•Seeks to find the 
best available officer 
to fill the position 








Figure 7.   Simplified Officer Assignment Process Diagram 
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Referring to the hierarchy of coding in Figure (2), the Navy’s manpower 
organization is structured around the top three: rank, designator and AQD.  To fill any 
FM position in the Navy, one of 42 detailers and one of 27 placement officers must 
negotiate and come to an agreement when an FM qualified officer becomes available for 
assignment. 
 
2. Process Details 
Once the detailer finds a billet that is both available and matches the Projected 
Rotation Date (PRD) of the officer he is trying to place, a proposal is generated in the 
Officer Assignment Information System (OAIS).  OAIS has a linear tracking function to 
manage these proposals.  The detailer initiates this process.  Each stakeholder in the 
process must approve the officer-to-billet match or the proposal is returned to the detailer 
as disapproved.  The approval process known as a “chop chain” is shown in Figure (8).  
All proposals are first routed to the subspecialty manager.  This Government Service 
(GS) employee documents experience, education and further routes the proposal for a 
waiver if needed.  This is a critical control point for the utilization rate investigated by 
Blaisdell. [Ref. 4]  For example, a recent FM graduate from NPS would require a waiver 
if that officer was not being ordered into a FM (3110X) billet.   
 
Original 





If YES: To PERS-44






















Figure 8.   Orders Approval Process 
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After evaluation by the Subspecialty Manager, the proposal is optionally routed to 
the Acquisition Professional (AP) and Joint community managers.  The routing criteria 
used is whether the officer is inbound or outbound to a Joint/Acquisition Professional 
(AP) job or if the officer possesses an AQD for one of those two skill sets.  The next 
stakeholder in the process is the officer representing the command, the placement officer.  
To fill a billet at the FMB headquarters in the Pentagon, the gaining placement officer 
would first look at rank and designator to determine fit.  If those two variables match, 
then subspecialty is the final check.   
In the case of Navy staff jobs at the Pentagon, a nomination is informally made to 
the manpower point of contact at each staff.  Normally, candidates records are sent 
individually and the staff is given right of refusal.  A managerial dilemma can be created 
by refusal.  Due to population numbers and the timing of rotation, the officer proposed is 
frequently the only close fit to the impending opening on the staff.  Unless a perfect fit is 
proposed, the staff is forced into one of three options.   
First, the job will be filled with an officer meeting less than the required 
qualifications.  If this is unacceptable, the incumbent in the job will depart and the 
position will sit empty until a fully qualified officer is assigned.  For most staffs, this 
alternative is avoided.  Presented with this choice, the incumbent officer will be forced to 
extend to cover the gap or the leadership of the staff will become involved and inject a 
personal query into the NPC chain of command.  Usually, this path results in an early 
transfer or re-routing of a qualified officer from another command. 
 
3. Billet to Officer Mismatches 
There exists a mismatch in the control leverage of the stakeholders shown in 
Figure (8).  Rank and influence are significant forces in the detailer-placement officer 
interchange.  All of the major decision makers in the approval process outrank the 
subspecialty manager, the only advocate for the FM community as a whole.  This 
Government Service (GS) employee ensures that education and experience subspecialty 
designations are entered into the officer’s manpower record.  However, this analyst is not 
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directly involved in the negotiations that occur between the detailers and placement 
officers.  Additionally, the subspecialty manager is responsible for all of the 90 or so 
subspecialties that apply to URL officers not just the FM ones. 
 
4. Assignment Levers of Control 
Referring to Figure (5), the inputs to the assignment sub-process are set by officer 
career progression and rotation.  The process itself is owned entirely by NPC.  While 
FMB has informal approval authority for positions on his Pentagon staff, there exists no 
formal authorized lever of control. 
 
E. PROCESS - NAVY OFFICER CAREER PROMOTION  
 
1. Promotion Limits 
The promotion of military officers is a tightly controlled process both internally 
and externally.  Externally, the promotion system is regulated by two controls.  The 
combination of United States Code (USC) Title 10 and end-strength levels delineated in 
the annual National Defense Authorization Act limit the flow of promotion.  USC 10 
limits the number of regular commissioned officers to 55,000 for the Navy. [Ref. 18]  
Based on annual officer end strength, the distribution by rank is capped by the Defense 






39,000 8,735 22.4% 5,681 14.6% 2,437 6.2%
42,000 9,203 21.9% 5,902 14.1% 2,544 6.1%
45,000 9,671 21.5% 6,123 13.6% 2,651 5.9%
48,000 10,139 21.1% 6,343 13.2% 2,758 5.7%
51,000 10,606 20.8% 6,561 12.9% 2,864 5.6%
54,000 11,074 20.5% 6,782 12.6% 2,971 5.5%
57,000 11,541 20.2% 7,002 12.3% 3,078 5.4%
LCDR CDR CAPT
 
Table 6. DOPMA Regulated Rank Ceilings [After Ref. 18] 
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The number of commissioned officers used as the entering argument for this 
metric excludes flag, medical, dental and warrant officers.   It is noted that as the officer 
force size grows, the proportion of the more senior ranks decreases.  In response to 
service requests, Congress has temporarily authorized a six percent increase in the 
DOPMA ceilings to accommodate the manpower demands made by the Joint community.  
Ultimately, these external limitations control the output levels of the promotion process 
















Figure 9.   Promotion Sub-Process Diagram [After Ref. 14] 
 
2. Promotion Flow 
With the output controlled by federal law, DoD correspondingly controls the input 
by setting promotion rate goals and desired time-in-grade guidelines.  The DOPMA fixed 
output is extrapolated to a fixed system input.  Current and desired DoD guidelines are 
shown in Table (7).  Operating as an “up or out,” system, military promotion is similar to 
a one-way check valve.  Officers who fail to select multiple times must depart the 
service.  Using this promotion method creates a closed labor pool for officers.  Within the 
URL ranks, there is no opportunity for middle or senior level hires from outside the 




Promotion to Grade Current Rate Guideline YOS Guideline
ENS O-1
LTJG O-2 approx. 100% 2 1.5
LT O-3 approx. 100% 4 4
LCDR O-4 80% 80% 10 9 to 11
CDR O-5 77% 70% 15.3 15 to 17




Table 7. Prescribed Promotion Rates and Timing [After Ref. 19] 
 
The closed labor pool phenomenon significantly complicates the control problem 
for the FM community manager.  For example, the FM qualified Captain who has 25 
years of service was hired in 1979 and can only be replaced by another officer 
progressing up the promotion ladder.  Recognizing the difficulties involved with 
managing this closed system, DoD allows the services to deviate from promotion rates by 
as much as 10 percent and Years of Service (YOS) by as much as a year on either side of 
the standard. 
 
3. Promotion Board Process 
Two distinct selection processes are applied to the career progression of Naval 
Officers.  A statutory board determines rank promotion and an administrative board 
determines career milestone selection.  As described above, Congress and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) regulate the input and the output of the promotion 
process.  Additionally, these two organizations external to the Navy also regulate the 
statutory board process.  Setting guidelines of conduct and explicit reporting 
requirements, DOD and federal law have significant inputs to the process.  The process 
itself is conducted annually at NPC in Millington, TN.  Selection board members go into 
isolation, similar to a jury sequester,  and spend weeks reviewing the service records of 
eligible officers to determine which ones are the best qualified for promotion.  
URL Promotion board members are approved by the Secretary of the Navy 
(SECNAV) and must include five aviators, four surface warfare officers (SWO) and three 
submariners. [Ref. 20]  One of the SWO’s can be a Special Warfare or Special 
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Operations officer.  Additionally, DoD and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) 
require at least one of the members to be Joint and another to be Acquisition Professional 
(AP) qualified.   
 
4. Board Precepts 
SECNAV designates a board president and gives him explicit written guidance on 
board conduct.  This document is referred to as a board precept.  Tasked to determine the 
“best qualified” officers, the board members use the precept to guide their decision-
making.  The overarching goal for all URL boards is recognizing officers who have 
demonstrated operational excellence.  The following extract is from the second paragraph 
of the FY-05 URL Captain Board Precept. 
The needs of the Navy dictate that our future leaders possess the qualities 
to excel as leaders and commanders or in support of operational 
commanders.  Proven excellence in leadership positions is the ultimate 
measure of the qualities required.  Performance while in command, at 
sea as well as potential for major command, is the ultimate test of 
fitness for promotion. [Ref. 21] 
As a point of comparison, the same paragraph for the FY-05 Commander Board Precept 
is shown below. 
The needs of the Navy dictate that our future leaders possess the qualities 
to excel as leaders and commanders or in support of operational 
commanders or positions of leadership in direct support of fleet 
operations.  Proven excellence in leadership positions is the ultimate 
measure of the qualities required.  Performance while in command, at 
sea as well as potential for major command, is the ultimate test of 
fitness for promotion.  Officers may have also demonstrated leadership, 
skill, integrity and resourcefulness in other difficult and challenging joint 
and in-service assignments. [Ref. 22] 
These documents highlight two main points.  First, operational excellence is 
critical for URL promotion and no other skill set can compensate for a lackluster 
performance at sea.  Secondly, this critical control device does not appear to be carefully 
screened.  As the Captain precept states, command at sea is the ultimate test for 
promotion.  However, the number of officers who would have command at sea prior to a 
Commander promotion board is very small.  Most competitive submariners and SWO’s 
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would be just completing their Executive Officer (XO) afloat tours and aviators would be 
at the conclusion of their Department Head (DH) tours.  Finally, tasking the board 
members to look for the potential for major command is premature at a Commander 
selection board. 
Judge Advocate General (JAG) officers from the CNO’s staff and the Chief of 
Naval Personnel (CNP) staff draft generic precept language annually.  Included in this 
boilerplate text are further items that a selection board should consider after ascertaining 
that the subject officer has proven excellence in the operational realm.  Appearing as the 
third paragraph in the precept, these skill sets are identified as important for selection to 
Captain. 
 
• Graduate Education 
• Innovation and Efficiency 
• Acquisition Professional (AP) 
• Joint Duty 
• International Affairs 
• Astronaut 
• Anti-Terrorism Force Protection 
• Navy Space Cadre 
• Retention Effectiveness 
• Naval Special Warfare Experience 
 
 AP and Joint Duty inclusion on this list is in response to the external reporting 
requirements by DoD and CJCS respectively.  Both organizations expect the promotion 
of AP and Joint officers to equal or exceed the overall promotion rate.  Graduate 
education is the second skill set listed after operational acumen.  With the exception of 
operational excellence, precept language does not imply that the skill sets listed above are 
in any order of priority.  Specifically, education guidance states: 
Postgraduate education and specialty skills represented by proven 
subspecialties are important to our Navy and represent a key investment in 
our future.  Navy needs officers with formal technical and military 
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education in a time of increasing technological sophistication.  Advanced 
education achievement is a significant career milestone in the 
development of future Navy leadership.  The utilization of advanced 
education in subspecialty tours is an equally significant career milestone. 
In determining an officer’s fitness for selection, selection boards shall 
favorably consider graduate degrees, military education, and experience in 
specialized areas.  [Ref. 21] 
 The language identifies the importance of a proven subspecialty, however it only 
highlights “technical and military” education.  While military education is undoubtedly 
important for URL officers, the criticality of a technical education is debatable.  The 
recent creation of the Information Professional (IP) community augments an already 
robust mixture of Restricted Line and Staff Corps officers who are technically proficient.  
There are generic statements about efficiency in the Innovation and Efficiency section, 
but nowhere in the precept language does the SECNAV specifically identify business 
acumen or the ability to lead in an enterprise situation.   
 
5. Interaction between Statutory and Admin Boards 
This analysis identifies another critical control element.  If command at sea is the 
primary criteria for selection to Captain, then the selection for command at sea is very 
much a prerequisite for selection to Captain.  Conducted in identical fashion to the 
statutory boards, administrative or “admin” boards are used to select officers for career 
milestones such as command at sea.  The interaction between statutory promotion and 
administrative selection is shown in Figure (10). 
In most cases, the admin board controls a significant aspect of the officer’s next 
statutory board.  Using a SWO as an example, the typical officer is selected for 
department head (DH) when he is a Lieutenant (LT).  Performance in his DH tour will 
determine his selection for Lieutenant Commander (LCDR).  However, it is likely that 

























Figure 10.   Interaction of Statutory and Admin Selection Points [After Ref. 23] 
 
This dependency is most evident at the CDR Command level.  As shown in the 
precept language, performance in command at sea is the primary qualifier for promotion 
to Captain.  All things being equal, those officers not selected for command have little 
potential for selection to Captain over those officers who have served in command.  
Within the confines of the promotion process, the FM-qualified URL Captain has 
successfully screened through three statutory boards and either two or three admin 
boards.   
 
6. Promotion Levers of Control 
As suggested by Figure (9), the inputs, outputs and process of promotion are 
tightly controlled by regulations and other external organizations.  Referring to the 
cybernetic model, the only lever of control accessible by the FM community manager is 
the standard applied to promotion.  In the case of the promotion sub-process, this 






As demonstrated in the Literature Review, the Naval Postgraduate School’s FM 
program is effective whether one is measuring cost, academic skill level or applicability 
to the FM positions within the Navy. 
 
1. Curriculum Sponsor 
FMB as FM curriculum sponsor has several mechanisms to control the education 
sub-process shown in Figure (11).  By setting the Education Skill Requirements (ESR’s), 















Figure 11.   Education Sub-Process Diagram [After Ref. 14] 
 
By conducting curriculum reviews, he holds the faculty to the ESR’s and provides 
feedback about the quality and relevance of the curriculum to NPS.  By participating 
annually in the NPS quota plan, he has input to the number and designator mix of 
incoming students.  Controlling the inputs and the standard, the FM community manager 
has significant control over the NPS-owned education process. 
Students are assigned to NPS via the assignment process described earlier in this 
chapter.  Assuming there is an available quota, prospective NPS students must meet 
minimum academic levels before assignment to NPS.  The NPS placement officer applies 
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a standard referred to as the Academic Profile Code (APC).  The prerequisite for the FM 
program at NPS is an APC of 345.  Decoded, this means the incoming officer must have 
an undergraduate Grade Point Average (GPA) greater than 2.2 and have taken at least 
one pre-calculus course with a grade of C+ or better. [Ref. 24]   Meeting or exceeding 
this APC is the only quality standard evaluated by the NPS placement officer prior to 
assignment at NPS.   
 
2. Education Levers of Control 
FMB controls or has access to the standards, inputs, and process.  Factors not 
directly controlled by the FM community manager within the education sub-process are 
the quality of the inbound student and NPS faculty hiring decisions. 
 
G. CONTROL SYSTEM SUMMARY 
 
This chapter defined the processes and structures that affect the qualification of 
line officers in the FM subspecialty.  With the processes, inputs and outputs of the system 
quantified and documented, analysis of the system can begin.  During the definition 
process, levers of control were identified and superfluous steps were removed.  The result 
is a simplified description that allows the manager to visualize where he can insert 
control into the system.   
 
1. System Complexity 
As described in this chapter, the process to match a qualified officer to an open 
FM billet is complex.  This complexity is magnified when viewed from the perspective of 
a 20-year career length.  In order to hold the most rigorous FM subspecialty, a 3110Q- 
coded Captain must pass through sub-elements of this system multiple times.  Entering 
through the education process once, he participates in the assignment process 
approximately 10 times with at least one of those assignments to an FM billet.  Adding 
the third sub-process, he must successfully screen through three statutory promotion and 
either two or three administrative selection boards.  
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2. Potential for Improvement 
To navigate skilled officers through this long and challenging process, the FM 
community manager must closely monitor and apply control where needed.  Of the three 
processes, FMB has the most control over education.  He has less control over 
assignment and almost no control over promotion.  Figure (12) summarizes these 








Figure 12.   Assessment of FMB Control 
 
 
Despite low levels of control in critical FM qualification sub-processes, there is 
potential for improvement.  The following chapter defines the role of business and 
financial management education in the Navy’s overall strategy.  Applying levers of 
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IV. BUSINESS EDUCATION’S ROLE IN NAVY STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Strategy is about positioning an organization for sustainable competitive 
advantage...Formulating an effective strategy requires analysis and 
synthesis, and therefore is as much an analytic as a creative process.    
[Ref. 25] 
This chapter builds upon the managerial control system structure formulated in 
the previous chapter by defining the strategic environment that it must operate within.  
By analyzing the strategy, the FM community manager can ensure changes made to the 
control system fit the Navy’s overall strategy and ultimately create a sustainable 
enterprise-management advantage. 
 
1. Business Mindset of Current Leadership 
There is no doubt that Donald Rumsfeld’s second tenure as Secretary of Defense 
will be remembered for his transformational initiatives.  While managing extensive long- 
duration combat operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Secretary has also forced 
the services to take a hard introspective look at how they do their business.  Secretary 
Rumsfeld oversaw the cancellation of both the Crusader self-propelled artillery vehicle 
and the Comanche helicopter programs due to inefficiency.  These actions put every other 
military weapons program that was behind schedule or over-cost under serious scrutiny.  
The Secretary was not afraid to cut his losses.  His transformational mantra forced 
innovation and efficiency, the same qualities that every business in the world seeks to 
attain.   
Secretary Rumsfeld was not alone in this mentality.  Key figures in the Navy’s 
chain of command are well versed in business operations either through training or actual 
practice.  President Bush was a former Texas governor and earned an MBA from 
Harvard.  General Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, earned his MBA from Auburn 
University.  Within the Department of the Navy, Secretary England was an Executive  
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Vice President at General Dynamics and earned his MBA from Texas Christian 
University. At the helm of the organization, Admiral Clark, Chief of Naval Operations 
was also an MBA holder. 
Key leaders in national strategy determination have all learned to analyze systems 
and processes with the goal of optimizing the bottom line.  This prevalence of business 
education and experience has become part of the daily operations of the United States 
Navy and ultimately influences its strategy. 
  
B. NAVY STRATEGY 
 
1. Sea Power 21 
 Midway through his tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Clark 
presented an enterprise-wide system model of the Navy’s role in the nation’s defense.  
Referred to as Sea Power 21, the concept has three main components. [Ref. 26] 
 
• Sea Strike:   Power Projection 
• Sea Shield: Global Defense 
• Sea Basing: Reducing Dependence on Overseas Shore Infrastructure 
 
 The “glue that binds” these three components together is ForceNet.  A 
combination of information technology and networked sensors, ForceNet accelerates the 
interaction of these components and allows the Navy to “dominate the battlespace.” [Ref. 
26] 
2. Infrastructure Processes 
 Three processes have been identified that support the development of the warfare 
triad shown above.  These infrastructure processes are: 
 
• Sea Trial:   Innovation and Technology Development 
• Sea Warrior:  Training the Sailors 
• Sea Enterprise: Increasing Efficiency and Streamlining 
39 
 
Referencing the research and development (R&D), human resources, operations and 
financial departments found in any corporation, Sea Power 21 is rooted in classic 
business strategy. 
 
3. Recapitalization Challenge 
 The biggest challenge identified within the business of the Navy is identifying and 
“allocating resources to recapitalize the Navy.”  “Sea Enterprise will reduce overhead, 
streamline processes, substitute technology for manpower and create incentives for 
positive change.” [Ref. 26]  The CNO’s identification of the power of properly aligned 
incentives to influence organizational behavior is an economic theme that is repeatedly 
reinforced during a formal business education. 
 
4. Business Skill Sets 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the CNO’s analysis of the skill sets required 
by Navy leaders is consistent.   
Our Navy values operational excellence as its highest priority and the vast 
majority of our training is devoted to sharpening tactical skills.  However, 
it is also important that our leaders understand sound business practices so 
that we can provide the greatest return on the taxpayer’s investment.   
[Ref. 26] 
 The CNO further explained an executive business initiative for junior flag officers 
at NPS’ Center for Executive Education.  While productive, a case could be made that it 
is almost too little too late.  These officers typically have 24 to 28 years of service and if 
they had understood “sound business practices” earlier in their careers, the Navy would 
be much better for it.  To meet the strategic goals of Sea Power 21, the Navy must invest 
heavily in increasing the business acumen of its entire URL officer corps.  The first step 






C. THE MBA TRANSFORMATION 
 
 Most MBA programs utilize a combination of analytical methods with actual case 
analysis to teach business concepts.  First, the tools of analysis such as capacity 
throughput and return on investment are taught and then they are applied to a specific 
organizational problem.  Examples exist within the spectrum of business education that 
concentrate on analytical methods or the other extreme, only case analysis.  However, a 
combination of the two seems to produce the typical MBA graduate. 
 
1. Navy Applicability 
 After learning these tools of analysis, the student applies them to dozens of cases.  
During this process, a transformation occurs.  Slack resources and inefficient systems 
begin to stick out like sore thumbs.  The student learns a methodical and rigorous method 
of analyzing an organization whether it is a clothing manufacturer, a cranberry processor 
or a more complex organization such as NASA.  A recent Harvard MBA graduate wrote: 
One of the best analogies I heard at business school was the comparison of 
a business manager to a medical doctor...If the doctor observes something 
outside normal parameters, she investigates further, until the source of the 
symptoms is diagnosed.  An MBA provides tools to conduct similar 
analyses with organizations...Like a doctor, when a student identifies a 
vital sign outside normal specifications, he digs deeper to find the root of 
the problem...Naval officers go through the same systematic procedures on 
board ship, submarine, or squadron.  Good leaders constantly pulse their 
areas of responsibility, be it maintenance, training personnel or watch 
standing. If an area does not measure up, officers access the situation, 
investigate, identify the problem source, formulate an action plan and 
execute it... [Ref. 27] 
 Like the Navy Lieutenant quoted above, the author of this thesis agrees there is no 
better educational process to build future Naval leaders than an MBA.  The NPS FM 
program goes even further by adding additional value to future Navy financial managers.  
In 18 months, vice the 21 spent at Harvard, an NPS student earns an MBA and completes 
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both his Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and the education requirements for 
Acquisition Professional (AP) Project Manager Level II.3 
These extra achievements are value-added tools for the naval officer to use in his 
future career endeavors.  With a 14 percent reduction in time as a student, the NPS 
student not only learns the skills of an MBA graduate, but also applies them to the 
challenging problems found in defense and public organizations.  To some, 14 percent 
does not sound like much, but if 100 NPS students were sent to Harvard instead of NPS, 
it would require an investment of 25 additional man-years.  Borkowski concluded in his 
thesis that this combination is efficient, effective and creates a “best of both worlds” 
educational environment. [Ref. 5] 
 
D. SETTING DIRECTION 
 
Once the strategy is formulated, the work has just begun.  Creating the Sea Power 
21 framework in which to improve his process, the CNO used his MBA skills and 
realized that a strategy must have priorities.  In his first year, it was Alignment.  In year 
two, his project was Revolution in Training.  Following these two initiatives, his third 
project was Revolution in Personnel Distribution.  Realizing “every organization in the 
world is in the battle for people and we had better figure out how to compete in this 
market or we’re not going to have the Navy that we dream of” the CNO used a free 
market analogy to describe the Navy manpower system. [Ref. 28] 
And it struck us that if we understood that we were in a battle for the 
human resources that we can get, we needed to understand the 
marketplace that we were working in.  And if we understood this 
marketplace we would start to begin to understand that we'd better be 
careful about this assignments methodology. [Ref. 28] 
In order for his strategy to be properly executed, the CNO is very dependent on the 
people conducting the execution.  Because NPC controls the career progression of the 
CNO’s managers, distribution process strategy must align with overall strategy. 
 
                                                 
3 As defined by the 1990 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). 
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E. MANPOWER STRATEGY 
 
 NPC’s head of distribution has aligned his strategic goals with the CNO’s.   
Similarly assessing that the manpower marketplace of an all-volunteer force is a delicate 
balance, PERS-4’s top four goals are: 
 
• Provide Optimum Customer Service to Our Constituents 
• Do What’s Best for the navy 
• Increase Morale and Retention throughout the ranks 




 Chapter I identified many legislated responsibilities for ASN (FM&C).  This 
office’s primary strategy revolves around the execution of those responsibilities.    
Overall, ASN (FM&C)’s strategic goal is the effective management of financial activities 
within the Department of the Navy.  
Breaking this strategic goal down into various components, the underlying 
manpower goal is to have every FM position filled with a properly qualified officer.  
Responsible for the 409 officer financial management positions distributed throughout 
the Navy, the FM community manager must align control and incentives to support Navy 
strategy.  URL FM officers, managed by FMB, provide the core business acumen of the 
United States Navy.  Every opportunity should be taken to educate, promote and assign 
these officers to positions where they can hone their business skills.  From this core 
group, the CNO will have a cadre of officers with the skill sets he requires to meet the 
Sea Enterprise component of Sea Power 21. 
With the system structure and process flows defined, the following chapter will 
analyze the FM community and identify weaknesses in control.  Once the weaknesses are 
identified, further examination will identify potential improvements.  
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V. MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
The process used to build line officers into financial managers has three major 
components: promotion, assignment and education.  As noted in the structure analysis, 
these processes do not continuously act upon Naval officers.  Instead, the officers interact 
with these processes at multiple times during their careers and only during specific time 
windows.  This complex interaction creates weaknesses in the overall system.  These 
weaknesses were identified by first analyzing the status of the system.  All data presented 
in this chapter are as of April 2004.   
Once the current status was determined, it was compared to historical data points 
to investigate trends.  With a firm determination of the system status, the author analyzed 
the process itself by first evaluating the overall control environment.  System risks and 
communication flow were explored prior to identification of managerial control system 
weaknesses. [Ref. 30]  Once weaknesses were identified, recommendations for 
improvement were developed.  These recommendations are discussed in the following 
chapter. 
 
B. CURRENT SYSTEM STATUS 
 
1. Billet to Officer Match 
A snapshot was taken to determine how well the managerial control system was 
performing.  Table (8) summarizes the billet to officer match rate as of April 2004.  Of 
the 409 FM billets, only 361 were filled, creating an 11.7 percent FM billet vacancy rate.  
This vacancy rate approximates the Navy-wide shore duty vacancy rate, but is a variable 
that the FM community manager should monitor.    
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3110 31XX 3110Q 3110P 3110R 3110S
3110P Education Only 200 75 85 13 20 2 28
3110Q Education and Experience 42 26 27 8 4 6 7
3110R Multiple Experience Tours 12 9 9 2 2
3110S One Experience Tour 153 62 72 3 12 4 14
3111P Comptroller (Education Only) 2 2 2 2
Totals 409 174 195
Percent of Total FM Billets 100% 43% 48%
 Officer Fully Qualified to Fill Billet
Billet Prerequisites Incumbent OfficerFM 
Billets
 
Table 8. Current Officer to Billet Prerequisite Match  
 
Table rows define the billet’s subspecialty code prerequisites.  Columns in this 
chart show the subspecialty qualification of the officer who is filling the billet.  The 
highlighted cells in Table (8) show the 62 matches having officers who are fully qualified 
for the position that they hold.  As shown above, 43 percent of FM billets have an officer 
with any of the FM qualifications (311X).  If this criterion is expanded to include officers 
with any business-related subspecialty such as Logistics, Manpower and others shown in 
Table (3), the qualification rate rises to 48 percent.  With 62 of the 409 (15 percent) of the 
FM billets filled with fully qualified officers, the process did not appear to be effectively 
meeting its goals as of April 2004. 
Further qualifying the results, Table (9) shows the fill rates of the 90 billets that 
URL officers are eligible to fill.  Organized by designator, it shows that certain 





1000 (Any Officer) 18 53% 34
1050 (Any URL) 5 21% 24
1100 (Fleet Support) 5 83% 6
1110 (SWO) 3 25% 12
1120 (SUB) 2 50% 4
1130 (SEAL) 0% 1
1300 (AV) 2 22% 9




Table 9. URL Billet 3110X Match Rate  
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Using a methodology similar to that used in Table (8), the FM-specific fill rate 
increases if the prerequisites are eased to include business-related subspecialties.  Rising 




1000 (Any Officer) 19 56% 34
1050 (Any URL) 9 38% 24
1100 (Fleet Support) 6 100% 6
1110 (SWO) 4 33% 12
1120 (SUB) 2 50% 4
1130 (SEAL) 0% 1
1300 (AV) 3 33% 9
Totals 43 48% 90
31XX
 
Table 10. URL Billet 31XX Match Rate  
 
 
However, as shown in Table (11), if 1000-coded and 1100-coded billets4 are 
removed from the grouping, the 3110X billet-to-officer match rate drops precipitously to 
24 percent.  Only one quarter of the billets that require operational expertise are filled 





1050 (Any URL) 5 21% 24
1110 (SWO) 3 25% 12
1120 (SUB) 2 50% 4
1130 (SEAL) 0% 1
1300 (AV) 2 22% 9




Table 11. URL-Only Billet 3110X Match Rate  
 
Easing the prerequisite to any kind of business experience or education, the match 
rate increases as shown in Table (12). 
                                                 
4 1000-coded billets can be filled by URL officers or any other type of Staff or RL officer.  1100-




1050 (Any URL) 9 38% 24
1110 (SWO) 4 33% 12
1120 (SUB) 2 50% 4
1130 (SEAL) 0% 1
1300 (AV) 3 33% 9
Totals 18 36% 50
31XX
 
Table 12. URL-Only Billet 31XX Match Rate  
 
 
2. FM Officer Population 
 After determining the FM billet structure was only partially filled with qualified 
officers, I studied the available population of officers.  Table (13) shows the available 
population of officers with any FM qualification.  As shown below, the majority of 




Subspec CAPT CDR LCDR LT LTJG Totals
3110P 51 113 119 62 345
3110Q 41 37 18 1 97
3110R 20 19 7 2 48
3110S 72 130 117 32 351
3111P 1 1
3111S 1 3 1 5
3110T* 8 20 45 5 78
Totals 184 308 285 143 5 925




Table 13. Total Officer Population with an FM Qualification  
 
 
Limiting the population to the URL communities, Table (14) shows the 
distribution of FM URL officers by rank and community.   
 
                                                 
5 P and T suffixes designate education codes. R and S designate experience codes.  Q designates both 
education and experience. 
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CAPT CDR LCDR LT LTJG Totals
AV 34 56 25 7 1 123
SWO 39 53 33 53 1 179
SUB 22 18 13 12 65
FS 10 15 28 2 55
EOD (1140) 2 2
SEAL (1130) 1 5 2 2 10






Table 14. Distribution of URL FM Officers by Warfare Specialty and Rank 
 
 
FM population distribution is compared to overall officer population and the FM 
billet structure in Table (15).  As can be seen below, the submarine community is 15 
percent of the FM community.  Correspondingly, the submarine community fills 14 
percent of the FM billets.  When compared to the submarine community’s proportion of 
the URL officer population (14 percent), it appears that the submarine community has 
closely matched their qualified personnel to their portion of the FM community.  The 
Surface Warfare community has the largest percentage (41 percent) of FM officers, but 
should only fill 34 percent of the billets.  In addition to the SWO community, the 
proportion of FM qualified Fleet Support (FS) officers is higher than the proportion of FS 
FM billets.  This overage could compensate slightly for the relative shortage of FM 









% of FM 
Billets*
AV 28% 50% 41%
SWO 41% 31% 34%
SUB 15% 14% 14%
FS 13% 1% 9%
EOD (1140) 0% 2% 0%
SEAL (1130) 2% 1% 2%
Totals 100% 100% 100%







Table 15. Warfare Community Population and Billet Comparison 
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3.   Matching Talent to Jobs 
As discussed in a previous chapter, the sub-process of distribution matches 
qualified officers to billets.  In its most simplistic form, this process requires NPC to 












Figure 13.   FM Distribution: Population to Billet Structure  
 
 
Figure (13) is deceptively simple.  Many of the complications to this process have 
already been discussed, but the most challenging one is officer career timing.  To meet 
the requirements of their warfare communities, URL officers have limited opportunities 
to earn an FM education and gain FM experience.  As shown in Table (15), the 
submarine community has closely matched its billet to population proportions while the 
aviation and SWO communities show deficits and overages accordingly.  Figure (14) 
highlights the differences between the nominal career paths of SWO’s and Aviators.  
Additionally, it highlights the main driver for this population to billet mismatch, a lack of 
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Figure 14.   Nominal SWO and Aviator Career Paths [After Ref. 32] 
 
 
The simplistic distribution challenge shown in Figure (13) is complicated by 
availability and timing.  Blocks in “Shore Tour” rows shown in Figure (14) are the only 
times that URL officers can earn an FM education or gain FM experience.  Comparing 
aviators to SWO’s, the number of sea tours remains the same.  However, aviators have 
one fewer shore tour opportunity than SWO’s.  Mostly due to early training requirements, 
this reduction in opportunity decreases the FM qualification rates of aviation officers. 
 
C. HISTORICAL COMPARISON 
 
 As evidenced above, the FM community has significant challenges in creating 
qualified officers and matching them to the billet structure.  As the closed labor pool of 
officers ebbs and flows over time, the FM billet structure changes to meet constantly 
shifting fleet requirements.  Utilizing the data presented in the Palmer thesis, Figure (15) 
compares the 1992 FM billet structure to its status in 2004. [Ref. 8]  Bar columns show 
the structure arranged by billet prerequisite.  Overall, the total number of FM 



















3110Q 3110P 3110S 3110R 3111P 3110T 3110E
1992
2004
Ed and Exp      Ed Only          Exp Only       Exp Only        Ed Only  
Figure 15.   Historical Billet Structure (1992 vs. 2004) [From Ref. 8] 
 
 
Over the 12-year period, billets were shifted from those requiring education to 
those requiring experience only.  As shown above, 3110Q and 3110P billets decreased 
while 3110S billets increased over the 12-year span.  Additionally, two billet prerequisite 
codes existed in 1992 that were removed by 2004.  These were billets coded T and E.6 
They may be categorized as apprentice-type billets.  Their removal created a dilemma 
within the system.  The only way to earn an FM (3110) experience subspecialty was to 
fill an FM billet, but doing so created a situation where an unqualified officer was 
accepted to fill that FM billet.   
Removal of the T and E coded billets eliminated the stair-step process used to 
teach officers FM applications and allow them to gain FM experience.  The complexity 
of the managerial control system has created a dysfunctional output.  The combination of 
three parallel control systems (promotion, assignment and education) constrained by 
career timing has produced a system that was destined for underachievement.  This is the 
problem facing the FM community manager.  FMB must determine a simplified process 
for tracking and controlling the outputs of this multipart control system.   
                                                 
6 In 1992, T-coded billets were referred to as subspecialty training billets with officers expected to 
perform budget cycle tasks under supervision.  E-coded billets were similar to the Q-coded requirement of 
both education and experience, but education for an E-code was only to the Bachelor’s degree level. [Ref. 
X] 
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D. NATURE OF MEASUREMENTS 
 
While FMB’s managerial goals may be broken down into various components, 
the underlying manpower goal is to have every FM position filled with a properly 
qualified officer.  While the organization calculates many statistics, the community 
manager uses two critical performance variables to evaluate its effectiveness. 
 
• Number of FM qualified officers at each of the qualification levels. 
• Percentage of positions filled with an appropriately qualified officer. 
 
However, simply measuring an outcome and not acting upon variances limits the 
learning of an organization.  [Ref. 14]  Without feedback, an organization cannot adapt to 
meet its strategic goal. The nature of the two measures used by the FM community 





























Figure 16.    Nature of Measures Model [After Ref. 14] 
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Independently calculated and verified, the measures are quantitative and 
objective.  They are extracted out of the Navy’s manpower system and collated for 
FMB’s periodic community report.  The two identified variables reflect all the relevant 
status attributes of the FM officer community.  The output of the multiyear process to 
create an FM qualified officer combined with the NPC assignment process is completely 
captured by these two variables.  However, the variables monitored are not responsive.  
Depending on the actions of NPC and NPS, FMB cannot directly influence the outcome 
of these variables. 
While objective and complete as shown in Figure (16), FM community manager 
control of these variables is limited.  This lack of control lies at the core of the 
management control dilemma.   
 
E. CONTROL ENVIRONMENT 
 
FMB, responsible for the assignment and training of 409 financial managers in 
219 different commands throughout the Navy, sets the control environment tone for the 
entire FM community.  The Navy Personnel Command (NPC) in Millington, Tennessee 
executes the human resources procedures to match the best-qualified and available 
officers to each of these positions. 
The inherent integrity and ethical values of Naval Officers are extremely high.  
Accustomed to structure and discipline, Naval Officers are devoted to the organization 
and attempt to execute their responsibilities with competence.  The most challenging 
aspect of FM positions is the core knowledge required to competently function as a 
financial manager or comptroller.  Often, uneducated and inexperienced officers are 
placed in these challenging positions by NPC because no qualified officers are available. 
However, accepting an under-qualified officer from NPC lowers the perceived standard 
for that position.  While a rigorous financial education is probably not critical to a 
majority of the daily dilemmas that the Navy Financial Manager faces, NPC nomination 
and acceptance of officers who lack formal qualification sends a negative message to the 
entire community.   
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NPC’s pervasive lowering of standards affects the entire FM community.  
However, the Navy command that lowers its standard and accepts an under-qualified 
officer is just as detrimental.  If the prerequisites for a position can be ignored, the 
organization’s members begin to question and possibly ignore other aspects of internal 
control. [Ref. 30]  As control deteriorates from within, the risk of control system failure 
increases.  In addition to internal weaknesses, external factors can also pose risks for the 
managerial control system. 
 
F. RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Within the Navy, change is a constant.  New personnel are continually replacing 
others moving on to their next career assignment.  Introduction of new technology and 
information systems is omnipresent.  These changes combined with organizational model 
reengineering such as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the current Force 
Transformation create an extremely risky environment.  
 
1. Fleet Response Plan (FRP) 
In 2004, uncertainty within the Navy is at a peak.  After weathering a decade-long 
force drawdown in the 1990’s, the Navy must aggressively pursue cost efficiency to 
recapitalize its aging fleet of ships, submarines and aircraft.  One component of this 
efficiency initiative is the Fleet Response Plan.  Since the end of the Cold War, Navy 
units had been operating on a very predictable time cycle.  Carrier Battle groups would 
train for 18 months then deploy for six.  Deployment location varied with world events, 
but the cycle itself did not change except during time of war.7  In the first few years of 
the 21st century, the Global War on Terrorism forced military units to break from this 
cycle and become a more flexible and responsive force.   
Typically, operational readiness would increase over the 18-month training period 
until it peaked just before a unit’s planned deployment.  Upon return from deployment, 
the unit’s readiness was allowed to drop off precipitously because the next deployment 
                                                 
7 Operation Desert Storm in 1992 and Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in 2001-TBD. 
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was 18 months in the future.  The Global War on Terrorism demonstrated the lack of 
planned surge capacity associated with this cycle.  If more units were needed before they 
were ready, large amounts of resources were required to execute the deployment.  In 
2004, Naval leadership and operational planners were developing a process to normalize 
the peaks and valleys of fleet readiness.  As shown in Figure (17), unit readiness will be 
kept at a higher level throughout the training period and the ultimate readiness peak will 
be reduced.   
 
Figure 17.   Fleet Response Plan (FRP) Future Concept [From Ref. 32] 
 
The cost efficiencies are expected to come from the fact that units would not 
deploy until needed by the National Command Authority (NCA).  While this plan creates 
the potential for cost savings, it significantly increases operational risk for Navy budget 
planners.  With a predictable cycle, budget officers could predict future Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) expenditures with relative accuracy.  With the Fleet Response Plan 
(FRP), implementation of this task becomes more daunting.  If the Navy were a 
manufacturing business, one alternative to demand uncertainty would be the creation of 
safety stock.  However, the Congressional appropriation process prevents the 
establishment of an O&M equivalent to safety stock.   
In 2004 and beyond, professional risk will increase for the FM community.  When 
failure is defined as not budgeting the proper amount for operations, it is inescapable that 
failure will become more prevalent.  To help manage this increased risk, FMB must 
ensure qualified officers are properly placed in FM community jobs. 
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2. Organizational Risk 
NPC’s practice of filling the Navy’s FM officer positions with personnel who are 
under-qualified introduces significant strategic risk to the organization.  Also defined as 
an operational risk, it is a breakdown in the established core assignment sub-process.  
Continued lack of control of the FM community manager’s two critical measurements 
could ultimately result in franchise risk for the U.S. Navy.  Such a situation occurred in 
1995.  
 The General Accounting Office (GAO) testified that it had discovered 
“substantial misstatements in almost all of the Navy’s major accounts and $225 billion in 
errors in the Navy’s fiscal year 1994 financial reports.  These problems are caused by a 
complex set of processes and system issues, and to some extent by the Navy’s personnel 
practices.” [Ref. 6]   The GAO study was initiated after the Navy was charged with 
multiple Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violations.  The consequence of this excessive 
operational risk was that Congressional confidence was lost in the Navy’s ability to 
manage its finances.  Rising to the level of franchise risk, improper management of the 
Navy’s (FM) community tarnished its image and reduced its credibility within the DoD 
budget process. 
The 1997 GAO report conducted a calculation similar to one of the system’s 
critical performance variables, the percent of qualified officers in FM billets.  
Concentrating on major comptroller billets, the report found a qualification rate of 60 
percent for major comptroller positions in 1997.  April 2004 data showed a 15 to 48 
percent qualification rate8 depending on the criteria used. [Ref. 6]  While the comparison 
is inexact, it is obvious that the problems identified in the GAO study have not been 
solved for the Navy’s FM community over the last seven years.  In 1997, the Navy faced 
a relatively stable environment.  This has changed dramatically.  Placing competent FM 
professionals into these critical billets could help meet both new and existing challenges 
and significantly reduce the Navy’s organizational risk. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Tables (8) and (9). 
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G. COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION FLOW 
 
Information and communication associated with this control system concerns the 
placement of personnel, a human capital transaction.  Feedback communication to both 
NPC and the Naval Postgraduate School enable those organizations to make corrective 
action based on managerial desires.  FM community expectations are clearly 
communicated to each outside organization, however the FM community is but one 
stakeholder among many in the context of the entire Navy.  FMB is the curriculum 
sponsor for the FM (837) program at NPS.  In addition to ensuring that the NPS MBA 
program prepares future FM community officers for their duties as budget officers and 
comptrollers, FMB must also monitor the quantity and designator mix of officers 
receiving FM degrees.  This is required to ensure that critical FM jobs can be filled with 
officers who have both the proper education and the required experience.  These two 
relationships and the flow of information are shown in Figure (18). 
Information and communication flow is very well established in this internal 
control system.  Control begins to deteriorate when action is not taken on managerial 
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Figure 18.   FM Stakeholder Communication Paths 
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H. MANAGERIAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES 
 
FMB is responsible for the 409 financial management positions distributed 
throughout the Navy.  In order to meet the goal of effectively managing financial 
activities within the Department of the Navy, FMB should ideally have every FM 
position filled with a properly qualified officer.   
 
1. Managerial Control Weakness  #1 
While ideal, a 100 percent goal is very optimistic considering that historical billet-
to-officer qualification levels fall well short of that.  A 100 percent personnel placement 
goal is currently and historically unachievable.  Achievable short-term targets are not 
identified.  Goals and targets are not associated with time frames to gauge progress.  
Unachievable goals can actually reduce the motivation level of the organization’s 
employees.  Additionally, overly optimistic goals that are historically unreachable have 
limited positive organizational impact. 
• Weakness #1: The personnel placement goal is currently and historically 
unachievable.  Achievable short-term targets are not identified.  Goals and 
target are not associated with time frames to gauge progress. 
 
2. Managerial Control Weakness  #2 
By setting a clear strategic goal, this formal information system allows FMB to 
concentrate attention on the functions of the Budget Office and apply only the time 
needed to receive periodic updates on FM community status.  Two critical data points are 
included in this report; the number of FM qualified officers and the percent of positions 
filled by a qualified officer.  Simply measuring an outcome and not acting upon variances 
limits the learning of an organization.  Without feedback, an organization cannot adapt to 
meet the strategic goal.  
• Weakness #2: Performance Variances are not calculated. Variance 
information is not used as feedback. 
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3. Managerial Control Weakness  #3 
As has been discussed, this complex process takes many years to create a fully 
qualified FM officer.  Additionally, during this FM qualification period the officer is not 
doing his or her primary function in the Navy.  For line officers, this is either flying 
aircraft or driving ships and submarines.  Time away from primary responsibilities in the 
Navy can put that officer’s promotion probability at risk.  If an officer is a Surface 
Warfare expert, he or she is rewarded for jobs such as teaching new Surface Warriors or 
working on a staff that directly supports fleet operations.  Receiving an MBA at NPS or 
working in the Pentagon Budget Office is viewed by some as a lesser assignment.  The 
reason this problem emerges is that an organization’s incentives directly affect its 
employee behavior.  Without a well-designed match between incentives and strategic 
goal, unintended consequences can occur 
• Weakness #3:  Incentives to become FM qualified are not aligned with the 
strategic goal. 
 
4. Managerial Control Weakness  #4 
Setting a goal in advance and measuring the outputs only partially accomplishes 
the requirements of an effective diagnostic control system.  The nature of the two 
measures used by the FM community manager to achieve his goal is shown in Figure 
(16).  Independently calculated and verified, the measures are objective and reflect all the 
relevant status attributes of the FM officer community.  The output of the FM 
qualification process is captured by these two variables.  However, the variables 
monitored are not responsive.  Dependent on the actions of NPC and NPS, the FM 
community manager cannot directly influence the outcome of these variables.  As a 
customer of the promotion, assignment and education processes, FMB has limited levers 
of influence to affect the system’s output.  In order to enable an organization to reach its 
strategic goals, the manager must have a lever by which to alter the system.  With limited 
control, the manager becomes a victim of others actions and must accept their results.  
Thus it is with FMB. 
• Weakness #4:  The FM Community manager has limited control of system 
outputs 
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I. SUMMARY OF MANAGERIAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES 
 
The FM community manager has identified two variables that are aligned with his 
organization’s manpower goal.  Despite this alignment, four distinct problems have been 
identified in the implementation of this managerial control system. 
 
• The personnel placement goal is currently and historically unachievable.  
Achievable short-term targets are not identified.  Goals and target are not 
associated with time frames to gauge progress. 
• Performance Variances are not calculated. Variance information is not 
used as feedback. 
• Incentives to become FM qualified are not aligned with strategic goal. 
• The FM Community manager has limited control of system outputs. 
 
With the weaknesses identified, analysis used to identify control levers will be 
applied in the next chapter to recommend control process improvements.  More rigorous 
control will improve the situation, but control depends on the people implementing it.  
More importantly, too much control can have adverse effects on the desired outcome.  
Proper control combined with incentives is the most powerful option.  The CNO needs 
business-smart warriors who can make the right decisions when dealing with constrained 
resources.  Adjustments to both control and incentives will enable the FM community 



























VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUMMARY  
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
And I’ve come to believe over time that we have not been as disciplined 
and as rigorous in our approach to manpower as we probably should have 
been. [Ref. 28] 
The Chief of Naval Operation’s assessment of overall control is supported by the 
analysis in this thesis.  The process to build line officers into financial managers is 
complex and challenging.  After examination of the promotion, assignment and education 
process components, it is evident that many different organizations are responsible for 
each step of control implementation.  As Admiral Clark implies above, the first step in 
improving the process is the proper application of rigor and discipline to the control 
system. 
 
1.  Control System Weaknesses 
Initiating solutions to the four identified control system weaknesses will allow the 
FM community manager to realize his strategic goals while also supporting the financial 
management components of the Navy’s overall strategy.  Additionally, proper 
implementation of these corrections will reduce the Navy’s exposure to operational and 
franchise risk.  Previous analysis identified the following four weaknesses. 
• The personnel placement goal is currently and historically unachievable.  
Achievable short-term targets are not identified.  Goals and target are not 
associated with time frames to gauge progress. 
• Performance Variances are not calculated. Variance information is not 
used as feedback. 
• Incentives to become FM qualified are not aligned with strategic goal. 
• The FM Community manager has limited control of system outputs. 
 
2. Control System Solutions 
The solutions to the identified problems can be classified by the expected time to 
initiate.  The first and second weaknesses are easily solved in the near term.  The 
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remaining two will require more time to implement.  By identifying potential solutions to 
the weaknesses, a logical order emerges. 
 
• Step 1: Develop a schedule of time-based FM officer placement goals. 
• Step 2: Calculate variances from established goals and provide feedback to 
NPC. 
• Step 3: Insert a control input into the NPC assignment process. 
• Step 4: Align incentives to desired strategic outcome. 
 
Two distinct methods could be used to implement the above recommendations: control 
implementation and incentive alignment.  While each method alone could solve the 
managerial problem, a combination of the two would provide the most comprehensive 
solution.  First, the implementation of more rigorous control is examined. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATION DETAILS 
 
While Steps 1 and 2 could be sufficient to solve the FM qualification problem, 
history has shown that NPC will not significantly change their practices without Step 3, 
the insertion of a control input into the process.  Ultimately, the alignment of incentives, 
Step 4, should allow reduction of FMB control of the NPC assignment process.  Only 
after reaching the goals established in Step 1, can control reduction be considered.  If the 
above control system modifications are implemented, the newly established goals and 
processes could not only improve the FM community, but also ease the transition that 
occurs when the Budget Officer position changes.  An analysis of the required data and 
system alterations is provided for each step in the solution process. 
 
1. Step 1: Develop a Schedule of Time-Based FM Officer Placement 
Goals  
The data required to begin this solution are the establishment of placement 
percentage goals and an associated timeline.  Assuming a three-year tour of duty, 
approximately 136 of the 409 FM positions will rotate every year.  As shown in Table 
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(8), 62 positions are currently occupied by fully qualified officers.  This is a current full 
qualification rate of 15 percent.  By replacing all 136 rotating officers with fully qualified 
candidates, the qualification rate would increase to 48 percent.  This is the upper limit of 
the initial control goal.  Additionally, URL officers often rotate at intervals shorter than 
every three years.  This faster rotation opens additional opportunities to fill FM billets 
with qualified candidates.  This rotation should be diligently monitored to maximize the 
qualification rate. 
Officers are assigned a Projected Rotation Date (PRD).  Analysis of the PRD in 
combination with qualification status will allow the FM community to calculate 
reasonable qualification goals for NPC.  Setting an aggressive initial goal (50 to 70 
percent) for future nominee qualification levels and increasing this goal in subsequent 
years will incrementally improve the qualification rate of the FM community.  
Alternatively, the Priority Job List shown as feedback in Figure (18) could be expanded 
to include less critical, but important positions.  By demanding a 100 percent 
qualification rate for the smaller community subset defined by the Priority Job List, the 
goal becomes more attainable.  Prioritizing the list of 409 billets gives FMB managerial 
guidance to the NPC-owned assignment process. 
The strength of this solution is in its simplicity.  Currently, no formal goals exist.  
A plan to improve is the first step in the process.  Establishment of reasonable and 
attainable performance goals will sustain NPC’s motivation to achieve them.  The 
weakness of this solution is that FMB has only a limited lever of control to encourage 
NPC’s achievement of the goals. 
 
2. Step 2: Calculate Variances from Established Goals and Provide 
Feedback to NPC 
Once the performance goals and an associated timeline are established, the ability 
to calculate variances is in place.  This solution provides an additional feedback 
component to the assignment cybernetic model shown in Figure (5).  With persistent FM 
community feedback, NPC’s FM placement goals should remain high among other 
competing priorities.  This visibility should incrementally improve the qualification rate 
of the FM community.                      
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The strength of this solution is the establishment of permanent managerial 
attention.  Reasonable goals combined with accurate variance feedback will align FMB’s 
manpower goals with the outputs of the NPC assignment process.  The primary weakness 
of this solution is that NPC balances the many competing priorities for officer skill mix 
within the Navy.  If NPC continues to place a lower priority on the FM community, 
managers can do little to alter system outputs or the process itself.  
 
3. Step 3: Insert a Control Input into the PERSCOM Detailing Process 
The FM community manager has limited control over the system’s internal 
processes and external controls.  The first recommended control alteration is the 
establishment of an approval process.  Many high visibility officer positions such as 
White House and Joint Staff duty require NPC to send a nomination to the staff.  Only 
after the staff accepts the officer is the Navy allowed to release the officer’s orders.  The 
FM community manager already requires nominations for critical Pentagon FM billets 
and fleet comptrollers.  To increase control, FMB could request that NPC submit all or a 
prioritized subset of FM nominees to his Pentagon office for approval.  While this 
initiative will control the qualification rate of the system’s output, it would not 
completely solve the problem.  
As shown in Chapter V, sufficient numbers of qualified officers exist within the 
system to fill all FM billets.  However, the combination of career timing and competing 
priorities prevent NPC from assigning many of these qualified officers to FM billets.  
Inserting an FM community proponent into the NPC assignment process would greatly 
increase FMB’s assignment control lever.  Such situations already exist within NPC.  
Acquisition and Joint community managers are inserted as proponents for external 
stakeholders.  Inserting a control into the system would allow the FM community to alter 
the system’s output and reach its strategic goal. 
The primary strength of this solution is increased managerial control over the 
system’s output and process.  Offsetting this strength are significant weaknesses.  
Sending FM officer nominations to the Pentagon would delay the assignment process and 
increase the administrative workload of the staff.  Adding an FM officer to the NPC staff 
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would cost money and would not support recent mandated headquarters staff reduction 
initiatives.  Additionally, an FM community manager at NPC would set a new precedent.  
Joint and Acquisition managers are responsible for compliance with regulations external 
to the Navy.  An FM community manager’s interface with stakeholders would be entirely 
within the Navy.  This would seem to argue for nominee submission to FMB as described 
above.   
Implementation of these first three steps would improve managerial control and 
shift the FM community manager’s ability to influence to a higher state as earlier 
assessed in Figure (12).  However, the most powerful combination available to the 
manager is a merging of control and incentives. 
 
4. Step 4:  Align Incentives to Desired Strategic Outcome 
Promotion and monetary incentives are significant motivators within the military 
ranks.  As discussed in Chapter III, explicit language in promotion board precepts could 
increase the promotion rate of FM qualified officers.  As the sole promotion lever of 
control accessible by the FM community manager, FM drafted inputs to the board precept 
should reflect the Navy’s desire to promote business savvy officers.  Combining the 
possibility for better promotion with monetary incentives would create a significant 
demand for FM qualification. 
Among the 70 different compensation methods available to military planners, pay 
and entitlements are widely recognized as the most powerful force-shaping tools. [Ref. 
33]   Table (16) shows the numerous incentive and special pay line items in the Navy’s 
budget. 
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A. Flying Duty Pay A. Medical Pay
1. Aviation Career, Officers B. Dental Pay
2. Crew Members C. Optometrists Pay
3. Noncrew Member D. Veterinarians
4. Aviation Continuation Pay E. Board Certified Pay for Non-Physician Health
5. Career Enlisted Flyer Pay F. Nurses Pay
B. Submarine Duty Pay G. Nuclear Officer Incentive Pay
C. Submarine Support Incentive Pay H. Nuclear Accession Bonus
D. Parachute Jumping Pay I. Scientific/Engineering Bonus
E. Demolition Pay J. CEC Accession Bonus
F. Special Warfare Officer Pay K. Responsibility Pay
G. Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay L. Sea and Foreign Duty
H. Other Pays M. Diving Duty Pay
N. Foreign Language Proficiency Pay
O. Hostile Fire Pay
P. Hardship Duty Pay
Q. Judge Advocate Continuation Pay
R. Reenlistment Bonus
S. Special Duty Assignment Pay
T. Enlistment Bonus
U. Education/Loan Repayment
V. High Deployment Per Diem Allowance
W. Other Special Pay
Special PaysIncentive and Hazardous Duty Pay
 
Table 16. Incentive and Special Pay Categories [After Ref. 34] 
 
Of the incentives shown above, most reward hazardous duty or are designed to 
improve the retention of uniquely trained service members.  For FY 2004, appropriated 
incentive and special pays were $290 million and $1.19 billion respectively.  Together 
these two categories accounted for 6.25 percent of the Navy’s $23.8 billion military 
personnel appropriation. [Ref. 34]  Navy leadership has decided that rewarding the skill 
sets shown in Table (16) is more important than rewarding business acumen.  If the Navy 
is serious about building financial managers, it must not only better control their creation, 
but also reward them for their expertise. 
An innovative approach to rewarding FM qualified officers to fill FM billets 
would be an expansion of the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) program.  Currently 
limited to the enlisted ranks, this program rewards Sailors who volunteer for relatively 
undesirable jobs in Japan and Italy.  While there are no plans for expansion into the 
officer ranks, there is “nothing in the legislation that prevents its expansion to officers.”  
[Ref. 35]   
The AIP program operates as a reverse auction.  Qualified Sailors bid 
electronically for a bonus associated with these jobs.  Starting at $450 per month, the job 
is awarded to the best-qualified applicant with the lowest bid.  [Ref. 35]  This market-
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based approach provides the lowest cost bonus level required to fill the position 
voluntarily.  This model could be an ideal fit for the FM community.   While currently 
limited to a maximum of $1500 per month, the bonus could be used to reward FM 
officers who take challenging FM positions.  [Ref. 35]   
The FM community manager could set the bonus level and only those officers 
with the required level of education and experience would be qualified to apply.   
Combined with the promotion incentive, this reward-based structure would create a 
desire for officers to become FM qualified and ultimately fill FM positions.  Both the 
quality and supply of FM officers would increase. [Ref. 36]  If each of the 50 URL-only 
billets was rewarded at the $1500 maximum bonus, the total would be $900 thousand per 
year.  However, this amount would be the absolute maximum.  In all likelihood, officers 
would bid down those billets that are career enhancing or have other appealing aspects 
such as geographic location.   The end result would be the minimum market cost to 
reward FM qualified officers for filling FM billets.   
The strength of this solution is that FM officers are rewarded for seeking FM 
qualification and working in FM jobs.  With proper incentive alignment, the number of 
officers seeking FM positions would increase.  With this new demand, the FM 
community could increase selectivity when placing officers into FM billets.  The biggest 
weakness is that bonuses cost money.  Justification would have to be provided to Navy 
leadership for both the monetary and promotion incentives. 
Implementing the four-step solution outlined above would help solve the FM 
community’s qualification problem and ultimately allow the FM community manager to 
mitigate franchise risk and reach his strategic goal; Effective Management of Financial 








A review of the research questions presented in Chapter I follows.  
 
• Research Question 1:  What is the existing management/internal control 
system utilized to produce a senior unrestricted line officer with Financial 
Management training and experience?  
 
As shown in Chapter III, the process to train and educate a line officer in the FM 
community is complex and challenging.  The process itself has three main components: 
promotion, assignment and education. 
 
• Research Question 2:  What are the system’s strengths and weaknesses? 
 
As with any control system, proper design is a potential strength.  
Correspondingly, the system’s greatest potential weakness is the people charged with 
implementation.  For the FM community, the structure is robust; however, 
implementation could be improved. 
 
• Research Question 3:  What is the strategic manpower goal of the FM 
community? 
 
In order to meet the Sea Enterprise component of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 
strategy, the FM community must strive to educate and train its members.  The FM 
community’s manpower goal is to ensure that experienced and educated officers are 
utilized in FM positions throughout the Navy.  Control alterations to the assignment sub-
process would allow this goal to be met. 
 
• Research Question  4:  How can the system be improved to align with the 
desired strategic goal? 
 
A combination of better control implementation and tailored incentives would 
align the FM qualification process to support overall Navy strategy.  As previously 
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demonstrated, the CNO needs business-smart warriors who can make the right decisions 
when dealing with constrained resources.  URL FM officers, managed by FMB, provide 
core business acumen to the United States Navy.  Every opportunity should be taken to 
educate, promote and assign these officers to positions where they can hone their 
business skills.  Ultimately, the CNO will have a cadre of officers with the skill sets he 
requires to meet the Sea Enterprise component of Sea Power 21. 
 
D. POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
 During the examination of the complex FM qualification process, other paths 
emerged for further analysis.  The recommendations in this thesis are constrained by 
scope limitation.  Concentrating on existing processes and programs, the solutions 
presented are relatively near-term.  Examining the two paths presented below could 
suggest longer-term solutions for the FM community.   
• Analyze the feasibility of a FM community structure that follows the 
Acquisition Professional (AP) model. 
• Compare and contrast the FM communities of the different services to 
determine potential improvements in the Navy’s officer FM qualification 
process. 
Additionally, the creation of an Executive MBA course has further complicated 
the FM community utilization problem.  After earning a 3100 subspecialty code in 
general resource allocation, these officers could potentially fill FM billets.  Further 
research could analyze the effect of these officers joining the 31XX family of 
subspecialties. 
• With the first NPS sponsored Executive MBA (EMBA) course graduating 
in July 2004, utilization of these officers could be compared to existing 
FM officer utilization.  While their education falls short of the FMB-
dictated Educational Skill Requirements (ESR’s) of the resident MBA 
program, performance of these officers could be compared to those having 
met the requirements for the FM (3110) subspecialty. 
Ultimately, the FM community’s success could be used as an organization-wide 
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